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LETTER DATED 19 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 10 November 1992 transmitting a letter of the same date from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning a factual report on the implementation of the requirements of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), I have the honour to forward to you herewith the factual report in question, in the English language.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Permanent Representative

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Annex

[Original: English]

Factual report on the measures taken by Iraq in implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

(Baghdad, November 1992)

I. THE NUCLEAR FIELD

A. Measures taken during 1991

The first factual report, submitted by Iraq on 23 January 1992 (S/23472, annex), reviewed the measures taken in implementation of the paragraphs related to the nuclear aspect in resolution 687 (1991), which were as follows.

1. Iraq's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Paragraph 11 of resolution 687 (1991) called upon Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iraq has fulfilled this in a letter, dated 18 April 1991, from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that, "in accordance with the provision of paragraph 11 of resolution 687 (1991), the Iraqi Government reaffirms, once again, Iraq's unconditional commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of July 1968". Iraq also reiterated this commitment in a letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General, in which the Minister stated that "Iraq reaffirms once again its total commitment to its international obligations, including those of the Safeguards Agreement signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)".

2. Non-acquisition or production of nuclear weapons

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) demands that Iraq shall agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above.

In implementation of this measure, Iraq has done the following:

(a) The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Secretary-General, dated 18 April, in which he wrote:

"In accordance with the provision of paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq unconditionally agrees not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development or support facilities related to the above.";

(b) This commitment was reaffirmed once again in a letter, dated 10 October 1991, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the Minister wrote:

"I wish to reaffirm once again that Iraq stopped all its nuclear activities with the beginning of the aggression against it on 16 January 1991. Following the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), and in accordance with its obligations towards this resolution, Iraq decided to depart from its nuclear programme;"

The Minister added in his letter another paragraph stating that:

"The Iraqi Government stresses once again that Iraq never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and that the political leadership of Iraq did not at any time take any decision to direct Iraqi nuclear research in progress towards the stage in which any type of nuclear weapons may be manufactured;"

(c) The Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission had a meeting on 9 August 1991 with David Kay, head of the fourth inspection team, and gave him a comprehensive picture of the research work conducted by Iraq in the nuclear field. The Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission made clear to Mr. Kay the fact that the Iraqi programme was not what certain parties in the world had claimed it was, i.e. an attempt at acquiring nuclear weapons which might have got quite close to achieving its goal. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission Chairman also explained during the meeting why Iraq had turned to the operation of enrichment and abandoned the matter of building power reactors. The head of the fourth inspection team stated, during that meeting, that he had found the Iraqi side to be most cooperative and that he thought the findings of the fourth inspection team would be the beginning of the end towards assessing the size of the Iraqi programme. He also said that the Iraqi programme, in its present state, had nothing in it that might lead to, or help it move towards, the production of nuclear weapons;

(d) During the meetings of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of IAEA, held on 6 May, 18 July and 20 September 1991, the Iraqi Governor at IAEA submitted a detailed presentation of the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme in Iraq. Additional information reiterating this commitment was also contained in the address delivered by the Permanent Representative of Iraq before the Security Council on 11 October 1991 (S/PV.3012) and in the letter of 14 October 1991, sent by the head of the Iraqi side to his counterpart in the seventh nuclear inspection team. The latter document contained the following:

(i) Iraq's confirmation of its departure of the nuclear programme;

(ii) Studies and research had been conducted in relation to weapons, but no political decision had been taken to manufacture nuclear weapons; and all the research and studies conducted remained within the framework of laboratory scale and were never directed towards the production of weapons. There was no programme whatsoever for the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.

3. Iraqi declarations of nuclear materials

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) also demanded that Iraq should submit to the Secretary-General and the Director General of IAEA within 15 days of the adoption of the resolution a declaration of the locations and amounts of all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials along with their components and facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled this measure through the following:

(a) The letters sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of IAEA, dated 18 April, 27 April, 7 July, 10 July, 12 July and 28 August 1991. These letters contained information, tables and annexes including a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), whether subject or not subject to the IAEA safeguards systems. In addition, the letters contained answers to the questions raised by IAEA together with lists of the equipment and locations of interest to the Special Commission and clarifications concerning the history and nature of the Iraqi nuclear programme, which was devoted to peaceful purposes;

(b) Twenty-six letters addressed by the head of the Iraqi teams to his counterparts in nuclear inspection teams. These letters contained answers to the questions raised by the heads of the nuclear inspection teams or IAEA;

(c) Three minutes concerning the submission of documents to the sixth nuclear inspection team, dated 28 and 30 September 1991.

4. Placing materials under the exclusive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq should place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of IAEA.

Iraq has fulfilled this measure through:

(a) The letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General, dated 18 April 1991, in which it is stated that:

"The Iraqi Government agrees to place all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials to the exclusive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.";

(b) The submission of the materials covered by resolution 687 (1991) to the nuclear inspection teams, which took the following measures:

(i) Placing all nuclear materials under IAEA seals;

(ii) Destroying the parts for destruction by the inspection teams;

(iii) Removal of fresh Soviet-made fuel above 20 per cent enrichment, plutonium and uranium (U-233) from Iraq;

(iv) Removal of two streak cameras from Iraq;

(v) Sealing all hot cells and rendering some of them harmless together with the manipulators.

5. Destroying materials, removing them or rendering them harmless

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) also demanded that Iraq should accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 of the resolution, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified. This measure was fulfilled through:

(a) The letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on 6 April 1991, conveying Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) (S/22456);

(b) The letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on 18 April 1991, in which the Minister stated that:

"The Government of Iraq accepts the measures stipulated in paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991).";

(c) During the period between 15 May and mid-November 1991, eight nuclear inspection teams visited Iraq. Except for the second and sixth inspection teams, which were both headed by David Kay, a United States intelligence officer, the teams discharged their tasks in the country with the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities concerned. The Iraqi side facilitated, for instance, the following services to those teams:

(i) Providing logistic facilities;

(ii) Providing medical and administrative services;

(iii) Providing technical services (assistance in the destruction of equipment/components);

(iv) Assisting in transferring fresh fuel (unburnt) out of Iraq;

(v) Gathering nuclear materials in one site (Al-Tuwaitha) in order to facilitate the task of verification and detection;

(vi) Providing headquarters to manage the on-site operations of the inspection teams;

(vii) Submitting documents and plans;

(viii) Gathering the destroyed and operational components and equipment at Al-Tuwaitha, and thus facilitating the verification process.

The inspection teams themselves praised the Iraqi side for the cooperation extended, the detailed data and information presented, and the credible answers given in earnest to all questions raised by the teams. As to the problems which occurred during the visits of the second and sixth nuclear inspection teams, these were caused by conduct of the head, and certain members of those two teams, who kept creating difficulties to achieve such particular political objectives as would serve the countries they work for. The second nuclear inspection team insisted on conducting its work during the days of Holy Al-Adha (a sacred religious occasion and a public holiday). The sixth nuclear inspection team broke into administration premises belonging to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, stole documents containing personal data about Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission personnel and sent the data to Washington and not to the Special Commission, as revealed in the 22 October 1991 issue of Liberation which quoted a French doctor and a member of the sixth team as saying that the head of the team, David Kay, had deliberately sought clashes with the Iraqi authorities in order to create a pretext for a new United States aggression against Iraq. It is worth noting here that the membership of the second and sixth nuclear inspection teams was 38 per cent and 68 per cent American, respectively. None of the other inspection teams had as high an American share of the membership as these two;

(d) The eight nuclear inspection teams which visited Iraq conducted visits to more than 50 sites in the various parts of the country. More than half of the sites inspected were not related to the nuclear programme. Below are the details of sites inspected by the teams and of the meetings held with the Iraqi side:

(i) First nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 14 to 22 May 1991, and inspected three sites: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff and Tarmiyah.

(ii) Second nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 22 June to 3 July 1991, and inspected the sites of Al-Tuwaitha, Abu Ghraib, Al-Mussayab, the Vehicle Repair Unit, the Directorate of Supplies and Transport at Hasswa, Al-Rabee' factory and Dijla factory.

(iii) Third nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 6 to 19 July 1991, and inspected 21 sites, which were: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, Al-Suwaira (site No. 2, destroyed equipment/components), the Security Institute, Al-Ishaqi location No. 5 (equipment/components on display), Al-Razzaza (Al-Mijar and Qasr Al-Ikhaider), the artillery field at Al-Thirthar, the nuclear-power plant project in Tikrit, Al-Mussayab power plant, Al-Dawra power plant, the tank unit and electronics repair factory, the Akashat mine, the General Establishment of Phosphate Fertilizers in Al-Qaim, Al-Qa'qa' establishment, the Uqba bin Nafi' establishment, Al-Nasr general establishment, Bader general establishment, Dijla factory, Al-Fajr site, Saladdin general establishment and Saddam general establishment. Two scientific seminars were also conducted with this team in addition to two meetings, one with the Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and the second with the Vice-Chairman.

(iv) Fourth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 27 July to 10 August 1991 and inspected 22 sites, which were: Al-Tuwaitha site, Al-Jazira factory, Al-Sabounchiya railway station, the Saddam dam, the Engineering Design Centre, the Rashdiya water plant, the Rashdiya Teachers' Institute, the physiotherapy hospital, Al-Mansour unit, the wool factory near Tarmiyah, the north Rashdiyah orchards, the Officers City (Zayoona), the Zayoona public shelter, Al-Atheer Centre, Al-Furat factory, Al-Qa'qa' establishment, the Uqba bin Nafi' establishment, the general establishment of heavy engineering equipment, Hateen establishment, Bader establishment, Al-Nasr general establishment, Bilat-al-Shuhada' plant and Al-Kisek refinery.

Four scientific seminars were conducted with the team which also had a meeting with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission Chairman and two meetings with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission Vice-Chairman.

(v) Fifth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 14 to 20 September 1991 and inspected three sites: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff and the Geological Surveying Department.

(vi) Sixth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 22 to 30 September 1991 and inspected five sites, including an Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission administration building in Baghdad (opposite Rasheed Hotel), Al-Khayrat building, Al-Hilal joint industrial factory, the Training and Development Institute and an Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission office in Baghdad.

(vii) Seventh nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 11 to 22 October 1991 and conducted inspections at 18 sites, which included: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, an Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission administration building in Baghdad (opposite Rasheed Hotel), Al-Khayrat building, Al-Talaa'i Scout Camp in Rashdiyah, Al-Qa'qa' establishment, Al-Furat factory, Al-Fajr factory, Al-Atheer Centre, Project 144- Al-Mustafa factory, the Air Force Explosives Centre in Hatra, the Uqba bin Nafi' establishment, the Saladdin general establishment, the Saddam general establishment, the general establishment of heavy engineering equipment, Hateen establishment, Bader establishment and the Abu Skhair mine.

(viii) Eighth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 11 to 18 November 1991 and conducted inspections at 11 sites, including: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, the liquid nitrogen project, the Karkh water treatment plant, Al-Atheer Centre, Al-Qa'qa' general establishment, Uqba bin Nafi' establishment, the general establishment for heavy engineering equipment, Hateen establishment, Bader general establishment and Tarmiyah.

6. Halting all nuclear activities

The resolution of the Security Council demanded that Iraq should halt all its nuclear activities, except for the application of radio-isotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. Iraq has carried out this measure through the following:

(a) Between 24 July and 10 October 1991, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent five letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of IAEA, in which the Minister made it clear that Iraq had departed from all nuclear activities, and that all its activities of the past had become practically and scientifically non-existent following the destruction inflicted upon the Iraqi nuclear sites during the aggression of the coalition forces;

(b) The Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission assured the head of the fourth nuclear inspection team that Iraq, owing to the destruction to which its scientific installations had been subjected, was no longer capable of continuing its scientific activities. The fourth team saw the destruction inflicted upon those installations and agreed that they could no longer be of any possible use;

(c) The inspection teams which visited Iraq did not communicate any activity contrary to Iraq's above-mentioned commitments.

7. Halting, transfer and destruction of materials and equipment

The resolutions of the Security Council demanded that Iraq should halt any operation regarding the transfer or destruction of any materials or equipment related to nuclear activities, without prior notice to, and approval of, the Special Commission. Iraq has complied with this demand through the following:

(a) The letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on 28 August 1991, in which the Minister declared that Iraq had, since 28 June 1991, taken a decision to cease any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) (S/22998, annex).

(b) The nuclear inspection teams visiting Iraq themselves verified this measure, and agreement was reached with the third nuclear inspection team to transfer some equipment to other places, with a view to facilitating IAEA control over the equipment which was transferred under the supervision of members of the team. A quantity of yellow cake was transferred from the Tikrit site to Tuwaitha at the request of the seventh nuclear inspection team. The transfer operation was verified by the eighth nuclear inspection team. The seventh team also requested the transfer of quantities of uranium dioxide from location D to location C within the Tuwaitha site. Lastly, Iraq requested IAEA to transfer some liquid waste containing uranium from Al-Kisek site to Al-Jazira factory, but approval was not granted until the IAEA inspectors attended to oversee the transfer operation. Iraq works seriously to implement the measures connected with these activities, and the inspection teams visiting Iraq have not disclaimed or contradicted this fact.

8. Establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction

Paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991) states that the Security Council takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.

It is deeply regrettable that the Security Council totally ignored this paragraph and took no measure whatsoever for its implementation. Indeed, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 715 (1991), thwarted any movement towards the establishment of such a zone, until the implementation of the ongoing monitoring plan for Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991). Thus, the Security Council and in particular the countries dominating it allowed Israel to continue increasing its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction undeterred.

Meanwhile, the Security Council has as yet regrettably failed to take the measures required for the implementation of its resolution 487 (1981) which demanded that Israel should place its nuclear installations under international safeguards, following Israel's unprovoked aggression against Iraq's Temmuz reactor, which was devoted to peaceful purposes.

B. Measures implemented during the period from the beginning of 1992 to the beginning of November 1992

To complete the measures stated above, the Iraqi side took the following measures during the past 11 months:

1. Iraqi statement about nuclear materials

In addition to the declaration made by Iraq of all nuclear materials in its possession, which were inspected and verified by the inspection teams and which were placed under IAEA inspection, and in the light of the discussions conducted with the teams, and in order to prove the Iraqi side's goodwill in facilitating the tasks of those teams, Iraq presented on 22 April 1992 a map of the flow of nuclear materials in Iraq. That map was updated during the visit of the twelfth nuclear inspection team and on the basis of the discussions conducted with the team.

2. Placing the materials under IAEA inspection

During the period between the visits of the ninth inspection team and the fourteenth inspection team, the following has been completed:

(a) Moving all nuclear materials to storage site C, under the supervision of the eleventh inspection team;

(b) Reshifting and collecting of nuclear materials by Iraqi staff, under the supervision of the eleventh inspection team;

(c) The twelfth inspection team removed outside Iraq 14.5 rods of Russian fuel of 36 per cent enrichment togther with 23 sheets of French fuel of 93 per cent enrichment. This left Iraq no longer in possession of any nuclear fuel of above 20 per cent enrichment, as stipulated by Security Council resolution 687 (1991);

(d) Moving baskets of radioactive fuel to new baskets in the same site. The site of the berilium container was also changed under the supervision of the eleventh inspection team, following the leakage of underground salt water to the special fuel containers. Iraq has continually urged IAEA to expedite the removal of this fuel in view of the disastrous danger posed to man and the environment by this fuel while it is being stored in this abnormal manner. IAEA, however, has yet to set a date for the removal mechanism and operation to begin;

(e) Delivery and removal of all radioactive items from storage site C. This was done after the items had been gathered during the operation of the removal of debris. The items were sealed by the inspection teams;

(f) The fourteenth inspection team withdrew the following items:

Two sheets of enriched uranium (weighing around 200 grams of uranium).

Part of a fuel rod (about 10 cm) with 10 per cent enrichment.

A fuel stick with 2.26 per cent enrichment.

The purpose was to examine these items at IAEA laboratories in Vienna.

3. Destruction of materials, removing them or rendering them harmless

During this period, the following was done:

(a) Diluting of enriched uranium product at storage site C by the twelfth inspection team to render it harmless;

(b) The inspection teams, particularly the twelfth and the thirteenth, undertook the destruction work of buildings and equipment at the sites of Al-Athir, Hiteen, Tarmiyah and Shirqatt.

4. Visits of the inspection teams

The inspection teams visiting Iraq during this period inspected 42 sites spread in various parts of Iraq, as follows:

(a) Ninth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq during 11 to 14 January 1992 and inspected the following sites: Rashdiyah, the forest area, Tuwaitha, Al-Nasr establishment, the establishment of heavy engineering equipment, the Touzkhormatu air base, the mechanical industries establishment in Iskendariyah (Alexandria), the Dhul-Fiqar site, and an orchard on the River Tigris.

A meeting was also held with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and attended by the Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and the head of the Iraqi team.

(b) Tenth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq during 5 to 13 February 1992 and inspected the following sites: Tuwaitha, the Rafidain computer centre, the mechanical industries establishment at Iskendariyah, the Sikek (railway) refinery, the Ur

establishment in Nasiriyah, Jurf el-Naddaf, Qa'qa', Salladdin, the establishment of heavy engineering equipment, Badr, the Union of Arab Councils of Scientific Research, the Musil prison, the Badosh dam, the establishment of Jabir bin Hayan in Musil, the warehouses of the Electricity Department in Musil, and the warehouses of the Agricultural Supplies Company.

(c) Eleventh nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq during 7 to 15 April 1992 and inspected the following sites: Tuwaitha, Jurf el-Naddaf, Qa'qa', Al-Athir, Shirqatt, Jazirah, Furat, the establishment of heavy engineering equipment, Badr, Uqba bin Nafi', Al-Radhwan, Al-Amin, Nasr, Salladdin, Dijlah, Saddam, Dhul-Fiqar, the National Computer Centre, Al-Qa'im, the Department of Geological Surveying, Hatra and Ur.

(d) Thirteenth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq during 14 to 21 July 1992 and inspected the following sites: Tuwaitha, Tarmiyah, Shirqatt, the Iskendariyah mechanical industries establishment, Jurf el-Naddaf, the establishment of heavy engineering equipment.

The team completed the destruction work of buildings and equipment at the Tarmiyah and Shirqatt sites. The team also praised the cooperation extended by the Iraqi side to its members, as pointed out in the note of the Secretary-General to the members of the Security Council (S/24450), dated 16 August 1992, on the third page of which the following was stated:

> "As was the case in previous missions, the Iraqi side provided all equipment, materials and manpower necessary for the efficient implementation of the destruction plan under the supervision of the IAEA team." (S/24450, appendix)

The same report states, in paragraph 11, that

> "With the completion of these activities, all known key technical facilities and equipment for research and production of enriched uranium using EMIS technology will have been destroyed or rendered harmless."

(e) Fourteenth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq during 31 August to 7 September 1992 and inspected the following sites: Tuwaitha, Tarmiyah, Al-Athir, Qa'qa', Shirqatt, Al-Jazirah, Jurf el-Naddaf, Al-Razzaza, Al-Mansour factory, the Rashdiyah site, Bilat al-Shuhada, and K2.

In addition to these sites, a number of locations on the Rivers Tigris and Dyala, within and outside the Baghdad area, were visited to take samples of water. The head of the fourteenth inspection team, Maurizio Zifferero, stated on 4 September 1992, that the Iraqi nuclear programme had now been brought to zero point.

(f) Fifteenth nuclear inspection team:

This team arrived in Iraq on 8 November 1992, comprising 32 inspectors headed by Mr. Dimitri Perricos. Upon arrival, the team had a meeting with the Iraqi side to discuss the basic aspects of the work programme, in addition to:

(i) The contents of letters of the IAEA team regarding the request to provide logistical requirements to move the disposal drums from the Jazira site to Tuwaitha;

(ii) The data to be presented by the Iraqi side in response to the questions of the team;

(iii) The provision of the support required for the team entrusted with the task of taking water samples from water surfaces;

(iv) The team's request concerning the necessity to have a meeting with a number of Iraqi scientists, attended by Iraqi side, in order to provide answers to some of the questions raised by the team;

(v) The team presented a map with coordinates of the places to be visited for water-sample gathering.

The team began its field work as follows.

Two groups of inspectors gathered water samples from water surfaces in 36 locations throughout Iraq.

The team inspected the following sites: Tuwaitha, Jurf el-Naddaf, Ibn Al-Haytham centre, project 144, Nasr establishment, the Furat project, Al-Qadissiyah establishment, Badir establishment, Aukba Bin Nafia, Hutten, Tarmya, Jazirah, Al-Shirkat, Al-Kindi, Saddam establishment, Al-Amir, Al-Radwan, Al-Rafah, Al-Atheer, Dijla, Rabi'a, steel foundry in Basrah, Hadre, a design centre in Al-Rashidiya, Al-Milad Centre in addition to three surprise visits to Dar Al-Dhiafa in Baghdad, a tyres factory in Najaf and Al-Shaheed factory.

Several meetings were held with the Iraqi side during the visits of the inspection teams. During those meetings, views were exchanged about the progress of the inspection operations, with the Iraqi side presenting every clarification and information required in order to close the first and second stages of the requirements of resolution 687 (1991).

During this period, 86 letters were exchanged, 49 received from IAEA and 37 sent by the Iraqi side. The letters were all about the tasks of inspection and carried questions and answers about the Iraqi nuclear programme.

The inspection teams still rely for a lot of their information on enemy intelligence sources. Such information often misleads the teams to make a lot of unnecessary efforts, as was the case with their visit to the Musil prison

and their use of divers to search for some secret underwater reactor in the River Tigris near the Province of Salahiddin. The fourteenth inspection team also took, for laboratory testing, samples of water from the Tigris, Zab and Furat Rivers and from some lakes. This examination of samples was also continued by the fifteenth inspection team, which has conducted 10 such examinations.

5. Additional Iraqi measures

In order to prove the goodwill of Iraq in implementing the requirements contained in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the Iraqi side has implemented the following additional measures:

(a) Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz gave, in an address to the Security Council in March 1992, a detailed presentation of all that Iraq had implemented in compliance with resolution 687 (1991). Deputy Prime Minister Aziz also answered questions and queries raised by Security Council members, while members of the high-level technical delegation accompanying Mr. Aziz to New York held several meetings with United Nations officials to discuss the aspects of implementing resolution 687 (1991);

(b) An Iraqi technical delegation went to Vienna from 20 to 24 March 1992, during which time the delegation held several meetings at IAEA headquarters to discuss the destruction of Al-Athir site;

(c) During its visit to New York in March 1992, the Iraqi delegation submitted to the Director General of IAEA a full, final and complete report about the Iraqi nuclear programme. Subsequently, Iraq answered the queries and questions raised by IAEA in connection with that report, and the answers were given to the head of the twelfth nuclear inspection team on 4 June 1992. An English copy of the report was also given to the thirteenth inspection team and was subsequently discussed with the fourteenth inspection team. During those discussions answers were given to all questions raised about it by the Special Commission.

(d) The Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission had a meeting on 6 September 1992 with the head of the fourteenth nuclear inspection team and discussed with him the progress of the inspection operations and the means of expediting their final completion.

6. Establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction

The Security Council has continued, for the past 11 months, to ignore this item and has failed to take any measures towards achieving it.

II. THE CHEMICAL FIELD

A. Measures taken during 1991

The first factual report submitted by Iraq on 23 January 1992 (S/23472), reviewed the measures of implementation taken by Iraq in the chemical field, which were as follows:

1. Iraq's declaration of its chemical weapons

Paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq submit a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all chemical weapons and their stocks and related subsystems and components and all research and development facilities.

Iraq has declared, within the prescribed period, all the required information through letters sent to the Special Commission that contained:

(a) All kinds of chemical ammunition stocks and their storage locations and conditions, indicated by coordinates, as follows:

(i) 122-mm rocket ammunition with nerve agents amounting to 10,780 pieces distributed in various areas;

(ii) 1,776 aircraft bombs distributed in various areas;

(iii) 12,634 155-mm artillery shells distributed in various areas;

(iv) 30 warheads of Al-Hussein missiles;

(v) 20,000 120-mm mortar shells: type of agent (cs) tear gas. Declared, though not prohibited;

(b) All sites of production, quality control, mechanical workshops and filling;

(c) All research and development laboratories contained in four sites consisting of five laboratories on each site, together with one site which contains five analysis laboratories and one laboratory for chemical evaluation. All these sites were totally destroyed;

(d) All technical information related to chemical agents with their technical specifications and production methods. The various inspection teams were provided with detailed information on toxic chemical agents produced at Al-Muthanna State establishment as well as those under research and development;

(e) Stocks of toxic chemical agents together with their storage conditions and sites as follows:

(i) Mustard agent stocks: 280 tons stored in 20-ton containers;

(ii) Nerve agent stocks: 75 tons stored in 2-cubic-metre containers;

(f) All chemical, raw and intermediate material, together with their quantities and storage conditions;

(g) Quantities and locations of non-filled ammunition:

(i) 45,000 122-mm rockets of different types totally destroyed in Al-Muhamadiyat stores as well as 3,000 undestroyed at Al-Muthanna establishment;

(ii) 5,000 250-mm calibre aircraft bombs totally destroyed in Al-Muhamadiyat and 500 bombs in Al-Muthanna establishment;

(iii) 24,000 120-mm mortar shells totally destroyed in the stores site in Al-Muhamadiyat;

(iv) 1,175 aircraft bombs type DB-2 totally destroyed in the stores site in Al-Muhamadiyat.

2. Destruction of chemical weapons

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of chemical weapons, all stocks of chemical weapons and all related subsystems and components and all research, development and support facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled all the required procedures set out in that paragraph through facilitating the task of the inspection teams in verifying the information provided by Iraq referred to in the previous paragraph. The inspection teams thereafter supervised the following procedures:

(a) The destruction of the non-filled chemical ammunition at the sites of Al-Muthanna State establishment;

(b) The collection of all chemical ammunition from their various storage sites at Al-Muthanna establishment in order to proceed to empty them and then destroy them;

(c) The stock-taking, determining and sorting out of all chemical toxic agents and gathering them at a site designated by Al-Muthanna State establishment. After elaborate discussions of the Iraqi proposals concerning damaging and destruction of the chemical agents, the Special Commission agreed in principle to Iraq's practical participation in the destruction process. Therefore, the installation of equipment for destroying the chemical agents was started and successful tests were carried out in front of the experts of the Special Commission for the hydrolysis of nerve agents process.

The experts from the Special Commission praised Iraq's great cooperation to facilitate this process and for providing all human and material elements.

3. Undertaking not to develop chemical weapons

Paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire chemical weapons and all related systems and facilities. Iraq, through the letter sent by the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General on 18 April 1991 unconditionally undertook not to use, develop, construct or acquire chemical weapons. The inspection teams that visited Iraq verified such undertakings when they inspected many sites all over Iraq which included military camps, warehouses, air bases and industrial facilities. Most of these visits were made in a sudden manner without prior notice. There were also aerial surveying operations carried out by United Nations helicopters and the spying United States aircraft (U2), which covered all parts of Iraq.

The Special Commission, nevertheless, has found nothing that contradicts Iraq's undertakings and declarations.

The following is a summary of the visits made by the chemical inspection teams to Iraq during the period 9 June to 1 December 1991:

(a) First chemical inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Dunn, visited Iraq during 9 to 15 June 1991. During the visit the team conducted a thorough inspection of Al-Muthanna State establishment and found no discrepancy related to the Iraqi declaration. During the visit, the team was informed of other sites belonging to the establishment (those of Fallouja 1, Fallouja 2 and Fallouja 3) whose activities were not related to chemical weapons, but limited to the production of agricultural pesticides and chlorine, and which have been virtually destroyed as a result of the enemy bombardment.

The Iraqi counterpart also informed the team of some equipment which had been transferred from Al-Muthanna establishment to the site of the sugar factory in Mosul.

(b) Second chemical inspection team:

The visits of the team, headed by Colonel Peroz, during 15 to 22 August 1991, were assigned to several sites belonging to Al-Muthanna establishment, i.e. Al-Fallouja sites (1, 2, 3) as well as Tammouz air base and Al-Muthanna major site. The team did not find any discrepancy with the Iraqi declaration.

(c) Chemical weapons destruction experts team:

The team, headed by Mr. Johan Molander, visited Iraq during 11 to 14 August 1991. The team discussed with the Iraqi counterpart Iraq's proposals on the destruction of chemical weapons at the site of Al-Muthanna establishment.

(d) Third chemical inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Santesson, visited Iraq during 31 August to 9 September 1991. This team visited seven sites consisting of air bases, ammunition depots, workshops and training fields, to verify the Iraqi declarations. The team found no discrepancies with the Iraqi declaration despite the fact that the team was required to inspect sites that have no relation with Al-Muthanna establishment.

(e) Fourth chemical inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Knapp, visited Iraq during 31 August to 5 September 1991. The team supervised the destruction of the non-filled chemical ammunition at the major site of Al-Muthanna establishment. The work was carried out in line with the inspection team's plan with no obstacles. The head of the inspection team lauded the cooperation extended by the Iraqi counterpart.

(f) Fifth chemical inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Van Zelm, visited Iraq during 6 October to 9 November 1991 and conducted a thorough inspection of all material and ammunition at the site of Al-Muthanna establishment.

(g) Sixth chemical inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Brunner, visited Iraq during 22 October to 2 November 1991. The team visited and inspected six sites including an air base and ammunition depot. Following these visits the team announced that it had found no activity that ran counter to Iraq's declaration and that no equipment or ammunitions had been transferred from their sites.

(h) Expert team for the destruction of chemical weapons:

The team, headed by Mr. Barrass, visited Iraq during 12 to 15 November 1991. The team discussed with the Iraqi counterpart the Iraqi proposals on the destruction of the chemical weapons and expressed satisfaction with the Iraqi proposals which helped to achieve the purpose of destroying the stocks of ammunition and chemical toxic material under the supervision of the Special Commission. Mr. Barrass agreed to the removal by the Iraqi side of all chemical ammunition from their present locations and gathering them at Al-Muthanna establishment in preparation for their destruction and to begin the assembling of the incinerator designed for the burning of the mustard gas.

(i) Joint biological-chemical inspection team:

Tne team visited Iraq during 18 November to 1 December 1991. The team visited at short notice sites that basically did not belong to Al-Muthanna establishment and found no activities that contradict anything that Iraq had declared, except the announcement by the team of finding chemical equipment at the site of the sugar plant in Mosul. This equipment in fact belonged to Al-Muthanna establishment, which had been evacuated and transferred to the sugar plant prior to the war and was reported to the first chemical inspection team. The Iraqi side is in possession of a vocal and visual recording through which the chief inspector of the first chemical inspection team, Mr. Dunn, was given this information. The team expressed regret that such sudden visits had to be made to sites not related to chemical activities, but pointed out that the purpose was to verify the information they had received from intelligence agencies and aerial surveying flights.

The aforementioned inspection teams carried out a complete survey of all facilities covered by resolution 687 (1991) which had direct or indirect relation with the production of chemical weapons, together with other sites that had no relation to chemical activities, as follows:

(i) The major site of Al-Muthanna establishment in Samarra. The information supplied was verified against the actual situation. The chief inspectors of the inspection teams announced their satisfaction with the great cooperation provided by the Iraqi counterpart to facilitate the teams' work in all administrative and technical aspects;

(ii) Other sites of Al-Muthanna establishment (Fallouja 1, 2 and 3) which are basically allocated for the production of agricultural pesticides and chlorine;

(iii) Depots of Al-Muthanna establishment in Al-Muhamadiyat, which were destroyed during the war;

(iv) All air bases in which chemical ammunition was stored;

(v) The various declared and undeclared army ammunition stores;

(vi) Various other undeclared sites, selected by the inspection teams, to verify non-existence of items related to chemical weapons;

(vii) The inspection teams used cars as well as helicopters to verify the information;

(viii) The Iraqi counterpart provided the inspection teams with various samples of non-filled ammunition at the rate of three pieces for each sample, which were sent to the Special Commission. The inspection team also took samples of the various chemical materials, as well as chemical toxic agents for the purpose of analysis and

verification of the information, which was congruent with that provided by Iraq.

B. Measures taken between January 1992 and November 1992

1. Destruction of chemical weapons and munitions

The inspection teams which visited Iraq during this time supervised the following destruction operations:

(a) The destruction of 122-mm chemical missiles kept at the Khamissiyah and Muhammediyat warehouses. This was done under the supervision of the second chemical destruction team;

(b) The third chemical destruction team, which has been in Iraq since 18 June 1992, supervised the destruction of chemical munitions and materials at destruction site set by the Iraqi side at Al-Muthenna establishment. The quantities of materials destroyed until 14 November 1992 were as follows:

	Item	Quantity
1.	Missiles (122-mm cal.)	1 120
2.	Al-Hussein missile warheads (empty)	19
3.	Bombs (R400) (empty)	355
4.	Bombs (500-mm) filled with oil	14
5.	Bombs (250-mm)	74
6.	Fins of bombs (R-400)	333
7.	Bombs (155-mm) filled with mustard gas	15
8.	Bombs (155-mm) (empty)	3
9.	Propellant charges for rocket motors (122-mm)	5 700
10.	Water dissolution nerve agents (litres)	11 930
11.	Medial material of mustard agent (litres)	16 230
12.	Aluminium containers of 2-ton capacity each	32
13.	Motors for rockets (122-mm)	20
14.	Bodies for motors of rockets (122-mm)	700

(c) The team, which comprised three technical experts headed by Mr. Ron Manly, visited, from 5 to 8 November 1992, the main destruction site in Al-Muthana establishment, where the crematorium was fully operated for verification of commissioning, and to begin practically the continuous destruction of the mustard agent. The operations results were generally agreeable, for almost 3 tons of this agent were destroyed in the crematorium under the direct supervision of both sides.

The teams visited, as well, the unit for the water dissolution nerve agent and verified that the destruction process is going on normally and without any problem.

2. Declaration of specific weapons and equipment

On 19 March 1992, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council, to which he attached a list of equipment and weapons that the Iraqi side had previously destroyed in the summer of 1991 in implementation of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991). The weapons and chemical equipment destroyed comprise the following:

Equipment	Amount
Al Hussein Missile chemical warheads	45
Aircraft chemical bombs	800
Aircraft bombs	125
Mortar bombs	1 500
Aircraft bombs (250-mm cal.) (empty)	2 000
Warheads for missiles (122-mm cal.) (empty)	19 000
Chemical material	200 tons and 300 litres

3. Undertaking not to develop chemical weapons

In addition to the measures the inspection teams had taken in 1991, the chemical inspection teams carried out additional activities during this period of 1992, as follows:

(a) Seventh inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Jop, visited Iraq from 27 January 1992 to 5 February 1992 during which the team conducted inspections at nine declared sites and carried out four sudden visits to sites unrelated to resolution 687 (1991) where the team found nothing to be mentioned.

(b) First chemical destruction team:

The team, which was headed by Mr. Michel, visited Iraq between 21 February and 22 March 1992. The visit was especially made to destroy the 122-mm chemical missiles stored at Al-Khamissiyah warehouses, and the team used helicopters to reach and return from the destruction site.

(c) Second chemical destruction team:

The team, headed by Mr. Manly, visited Iraq during 3 to 13 April 1992. The visit was especially made to observe the preparation by the Iraqi side for the setting up of dissolution and destruction units at Al-Muthana establishment at which to carry out the destruction operation.

(d) Eighth chemical inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Godfrey, visited Iraq during 15 to 29 April 1992. During that visit, fourteen sites declared by Iraq were inspected to verify Iraqi declarations about the destruction by Iraqi experts of some equipment and weapons during the summer of 1991. The team also made one surprise visit, together with the tenth inspection team on ballistic missiles, to the Institute of Security Development, which is part of the General Directorate of Security.

(e) Third chemical destruction team:

The team, which arrived in Iraq on 18 June 1992, is expected to stay in the country for a period of up to six months at Al-Muthana site. While the present report was being prepared, the team continues its work.

As to the work done by the experts of chemical weapons destruction, a team of three experts, headed by Mr. Ron Manley, visited the site of chemical weapons destruction at Al-Muthanna establishment during 5 to 12 September to observe the equipment for chemical weapons destruction set up by the Iraqi side at Al-Muthana establishment. The team pointed out, in a press statement published on 16 September 1992, that the examination of the destruction equipment was very successful and that the destruction operation would take between 6 to 12 months to be completed.

III. THE BIOLOGICAL FIELD

A. Measures taken during 1991

The first factual report, submitted by Iraq on 23 January 1992 (S/23472), reviewed the measures of implementation taken by Iraq in the field of biological activities, which were as follows:

1. Iraq's reaffirmation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925

Paragraph 7 of resolution 687 (1991) invited Iraq to reaffirm its obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972. Iraq announced its acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) in a letter sent by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on 6 April 1991 (S/22456).

The Foreign Minister in his letter dated 18 April 1991 also reaffirmed unconditionally the obligations of the Iraqi Government under the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Iraq deposited on 8 April 1991, two days after its acceptance of resolution 687 (1991), its document of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons of 1972.

2. Iraq's declaration of its research programme in the biological field

Paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq submit a declaration of the locations, amounts of all biological agents (pathogens), and their stocks and all related subsystems and components and all research and development facilities.

Iraq was not in possession of biological weapons, and accordingly has not submitted a declaration in this regard. On the other hand, Iraq had a research programme in the field of biological agents for defensive purposes, which Iraq had abandoned since the autumn of 1990. Moreover, the site where the research was conducted was totally destroyed during the aggression against Iraq. Nevertheless, in order to check those who are dubious of Iraq's peaceful intentions and to foil the attempts designed to exploit this issue in order to continue the blockade imposed upon the people of Iraq and prepare for an aggression, Iraq declared its research programme in the biological field following the arrival of the first biological inspection team on 2 August 1991. The declaration, which was notified to the inspection team, included locating the site where the activity was carried out (the site of Al-Salman).

The inspection team visited this site and carried out on-site inspections of all its facilities. The Iraqi side fully facilitated the team's tasks. It is worth noting that the site of Al-Salman was amongst the sites declared prior to the arrival of the first biological inspection team when the Special Commission inquired on 11 July 1991 on the types of systems for detecting and evaluating micro-organisms carried out in Iraq. This is evidence that proves Iraq's broad-mindedness, cooperation, credibility and its keen desire not to conceal anything, even when having no direct relation with the context of resolution 687 (1991).

3. Submission of biological material and information to the inspection teams

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq shall accept the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of all biological weapons and all stocks of biological weapons and all related subsystems, components and all research and development facilities.

Despite the non-possession by Iraq of what is demanded in resolution 687 (1991), the Iraqi side delivered to the first biological inspection team, which visited Iraq during 3 to 9 August 1991, all the lyophilized living micro-organism strains that Iraq had imported from ATCC.

All the strains samples which have been used in the research were totally destroyed upon the escalation of threats to bomb the Iraqi scientific and economic facilities, to avoid environmental pollution with microbes.

The Iraqi side also delivered to the first biological inspection team all the completed research related to the biological agents for military purposes that Iraq had implemented at Al-Salman site, which was totally destroyed during the aggression perpetrated against Iraq. The Iraqi side also handed over to the first biological inspection team a list of the devices and equipment which had been evacuated to other locations. The team was further shown a fermentation device with a total capacity of 150 litres which was used for experiments and staff training, now that these devices (fermentors) have become among the basic devices that exist in microbiological laboratories, even the academic ones. The Iraqi counterpart also gave the team detailed maps of Al-Salman site and all its facilities. The Iraqi counterpart also responded to the demands of the inspection team by digging the buildings' foundations and facilitating the team's task to verify the number of floors in the buildings and collect different samples from different sites. The Iraqi counterpart complied with the demands by the inspection team not to move, lift or remove anything from the site, including the stores belonging to the military units. During their task in the site of Al-Salman which lasted eight days, the inspection team surveyed, explored and took samples from the sites and thoroughly discussed with the Iraqi technicians the research programme for defensive purposes. The Iraqi technicians fully cooperated with the inspection team and facilitated the team's access to all matters they required. The discussions were completely clear, frank and credible. The press release issued by the Special Commission on 14 August 1991 on the visit of the first biological inspection team said "No evidence was obtained on the presence of biological weapons or weapons filling facilities". The statement issued by the Secretary-General on 5 August 1991 on the visit of the first biological inspection team to Iraq also stated that "the Iraqi authorities cooperated excellently with the team".

Meanwhile, the first biological inspection team delivered to the Iraqi counterpart a number of questions to which the latter replied on 21 August 1991 in a letter of 24 pages that contained details on the micro-organisms on which research was conducted in the laboratory of

biological research for military purposes as well as detailed information on the Iraqi bodies and establishments that deal with activities related to medicines, vaccines, serums and biological research. The letter also contained a list of the biological research that had been completed at the Iraqi universities in 1988, 1989 and 1990.

4. Facilitation of the inspection teams' tasks

The second biological inspection team visited Iraq during the period 20 September to 3 October 1991. The Iraqi counterpart fully cooperated with the team, which inspected 10 sites including declared and undeclared sites. Four of these inspection tours were carried out without prior notice. The sites inspected by the team included Samarra drug factory where the team saw all the operations and activities carried out and the process of drug formulation. The team spent two days in search and inspection, and thorough scientific discussions were conducted on the activities of the drug factory. The team was shown all the equipment which was used for drug formulation in the factory and did not find any equipment for the purpose of fermentation, the production of antibiotics or any other activities that run contrary to resolution 687 (1991). The Iraqi counterpart supplied the team with a list of the imported lyophilized micro-organism strains for the purpose of evaluation and quality control.

The second inspection team also visited the veterinary vaccines' production site and the site for the production of foot-and-mouth disease vaccines and inspected all the equipment and apparatus therein, as well as the nature of the site and its laboratories, which represent the containment laboratories. These laboratories were evaluated by the inspection team as having the specifications of second- and third-degree containment laboratories.

The inspection team also received a number of virus strains for the foot-and-mouth fever as well as a number of the vaccines produced at the site. The team was shown all the detailed drawings for the site and also received a list of imports. The second biological inspection team also visited a destroyed site for the production of veterinary vaccines, which is the site of Al-Kindy Company, which is a private-sector concern. The said site was almost totally destroyed during the aggression against Iraq. The inspection team received samples of the products and strains used in the production of vaccines and thoroughly inspected its research laboratories, imports and origins of the imported materials and equipment used for the production of vaccines. The inspection team received a group of samples of the vaccines produced for the evaluation. The team also inspected the Serums and Vaccines Institute that specialized in the production of human vaccines and storing imported vaccines and their distribution in the country according to the need, and saw all its laboratory research and production equipment and apparatus. The inspection team discussed with the Iraqi counterpart the Institute's activities in detail, and received lists and samples of the bacteria strains used in the production as well as samples of the vaccines produced and lists of imported material and vaccines. The team promised to

facilitate the task of the Institute in acquiring vaccines and the material required for their production.

The second biological inspection team visited a site for the production of single-cell protein (Al-Hakam site) and inspected all the instruments, equipment, laboratories and other facilities. The team discussed thoroughly with the Iraqi technical staff and in detail the activities of the site and the initial start of this activity in Iraq from the beginning of 1975. The team also inspected the first experimental factory for this activity, which is situated at Al-Taji area. The team was shown the related research that had been completed during 1978-1982. The inspection team also took samples of all instruments, equipment and soil at Al-Hakam site, and also received samples of the yeasts used for experimental production and research purposes. The team was also shown the apparatus and equipment that had been evacuated from Salman Pak site and transferred to Al-Hakam site. Among the undeclared sites which the team visited suddenly and without prior notice were the flour and bread factory in Al-Najaf town, Al-Dora slaughterhouse and cooling stores, which contain frozen meat for civilian consumption and the blood bank in Baghdad. In all their sudden visits the teams did not find anything contrary to Iraq's declarations. The inspection team also visited a site for agricultural and water resources research that belonged to the Scientific Research Council, which has been abolished. The team was shown an experimental factory for the production of yeasts from carbohydrates (dates juice). The said factory has been abolished.

Following the completion of its visit to Iraq, the team published its report on the visit on 24 October 1991. The report says:

> "The team found no biological weapons or warheads or warhead filling facilities. Nor did the team find evidence, in all the 10 sites they visited, that weapon-grade biological agents have been produced."

Paragraph 12 of the report also says:

> "The Iraqi counterpart was cooperative. The warm hospitality to the inspection team was invaluable."

5. Sudden visits of the inspection teams

The joint chemical-biological inspection team visited Iraq during 18 November to 1 December 1991. This team adopted the method of sudden visits and visited 13 sites not related to the biological aspect. The team also used helicopters in surveying the sites and did not find anything that runs contrary to resolution 687 (1991). This inspection corroborated Iraq's statements to the effect that it had abandoned the biological activity for defensive purposes in autumn 1990 and is not in possession of any biological weapons. It is worthwhile noting that this team had also been searching for undeclared sites for missiles and chemical weapons, but found none.

6. Meetings of the Iraqi side with the inspection teams

During the visit of the inspection teams several meetings were held between these teams and representatives from some Iraqi ministries such as health, agriculture and oil ministries. Experts in the ministries of health and agriculture provided accurate details on their imports of vaccines and diagnostic materials and instruments as well as their activities carried out in time periods up to 1988, while the Ministry of Oil's experts explained Iraq's factual interest in the production of a single-cell protein from oil derivatives. The discussions were also attended by Iraqi officials in order to clarify administrative and technical details to the inspection teams and to answer all their queries to provide a lucid and clear atmosphere that would serve to remove ambiguities and dismiss any suspicion by the inspection team. Iraq has provided answers to all queries it received from the Special Commission pertinent to providing the required information on all the sites, whether those related to fermentation or vaccines production, or those housing laboratories that meet the specifications of a containment laboratory. The Iraqi side also gave details on its vaccination programmes whether for civilians or military troops and gave details on all its import programmes.

7. Undertaking not to develop biological weapons

Paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire biological weapons.

Iraq has undertaken this through its ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons of 1972. The inspection teams have verified this undertaking and found nothing that runs counter to the Iraqi declarations. The team were ascertained of the following:

(a) Iraq has not produced biological weapons;

(b) There had been one site for research in Salman area that was totally destroyed during the aggression;

(c) Iraq had totally abandoned research activity prior to the beginning of the military operations.

B. Measures taken between January 1992 and November 1992

28. The second joint chemical-biological team visited Iraq on 26 June 1992, headed by Army Major Karen Jansen. Between 26 June and 4 July, the team carried out 11 inspection operations at various sites with the fullest cooperation from the Iraqi side. On 5 July 1992, the team requested to visit the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. The Iraqi side found this request to be provocative, reflecting an arrogant interpretation of the mandate of the team and the Special Commission, and constituting a precedent aimed at infringing upon the sovereignty of Iraq. The inspection team surrounded the

Ministry's building and remained there while groups of its members continued to carry out their inspection operations of eight additional sites with the fullest cooperation of the Iraqi side. The Special Commission terminated the work of the team on 11 July 1992.

29. The third joint chemical-biological team, which was headed by Mr. Mark Silver of the United States, came on 11 July to replace the team headed by Major Karen Jansen. Its task was to continue surrounding the building of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation which meant that the team did not carry out any other inspection visit during its stay in the country from 11 to 27 July 1992.

30. During the visit made to Baghdad by Ambassador Ekeus, it was decided that a team of inspectors headed by Akhim Bermann, a German, should inspect the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation on 28 and 29 July 1992. Following that inspection operation, Mr. Ekeus said that the team had not found any prohibited materials or documents in the building.

31. In spite of the statements hostile to Iraq made by Major Karen Jansen, following the termination of her mission to Iraq, Major Jansen could not ignore the fact that she found none of the biological weapons she was looking for. On 20 August 1992, Major Jansen stated in Washington that "the inspectors did not find any evidence as to biological weapons being produced in Iraq".

III. THE FIELD OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

A. Measures taken during 1991

The first factual report, submitted by Iraq on 23 January 1992 (S/23472), reviewed the measures of implementing the paragraphs of resolution 687 (1991) connected with the area of ballistic missiles, which were as follows.

1. Providing information on the ballistic missiles

Paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq submit information on the ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts and repair and production facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled the procedures required under this paragraph as follows:

(a) On 18 April 1991, Iraq declared, and supported with coordinates, all the items contained in paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991). The information comprised the following:

(i) 52 Scud missiles;

(ii) 23 Scud conventional warheads;

(iii) 30 Scud chemical warheads;

(iv) Accessories, support systems for the missiles systems such as launch vehicles, test vehicles, fuel and oxidizer supply vehicles;

(v) 6 mobile Scud missile launchers of different types;

(vi) 28 stationary launching pads.

Despite the fact that this declaration included the basic information required by resolution 687 (1991), it has not indicated some secondary matters owing to pressure of time and the abnormal circumstance that ensued following the aggression, such as the paralysis suffered by telephone communications and refineries which resulted in complex problems in communications and transport that prevented the gathering of information from some remotely located sites. This information was supplied as soon as the Iraqi side reached the sites and verified their contents as follows:

(i) On 25 April 1991, a declaration was made on four mobile launchers destroyed in the western region;

(ii) On 2 May 1991 a declaration was made on four Russian mobile launchers in addition to those declared on 18 April;

(iii) On 16 May 1991, the Special Commission was notified of five locations for storage of missiles, launchers and support units as well as five sites for production, testing, development and modification;

(iv) On 19 May 1991, the Special Commission was notified of the research and development plan for the missiles (Fahad 300, Fahad 500, Al-Hijara, Condor, Al-Abbas, Tammouz and the long-range gun). Nine Fahad missiles which were covered by the research and development plan were also declared;

(b) On 18 July 1991 the Government of Iraq declared the long-range gun for research and development purposes as well as three sites where the major components existed, as research and development sites. Despite the fact that the long-range gun was still in the research and development stage and was not completed owing to the embargo imposed against the imported parts, and it was a weapon not ready for operation, and although it was not covered by the requirements of resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission was informed of this research project and all its details as a gesture of good will and to avoid allegations.

2. Destruction of ballistic missiles

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq destroy, remove or render harmless the ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled this procedure, and the inspection team verified the Iraqi declarations and supervised the destruction of the missiles, mobile launchers and related major parts, as well as the stationary launching pads, support vehicles such as transport vehicles and vehicles for the supply of fuel and oxidizer, warheads, missile containers, and tools and special dyes of production as follows:

(a) First missile inspection team:

The team visited Iraq during 30 June to 7 July 1991. This team inspected five declared sites as well as two sites that are not related to the context of resolution 687 (1991). During this visit, the team supervised the destruction of the missiles, their systems and the mobile launchers.

(b) Second missile inspection team (18-20 July 1991):

The team visited six different sites including military sites at Al-Taji camp and around it. They found structures of decoy missiles and some missile containers. The team asked for their destruction, which was effected in the presence of the team members.

(c) Third missile inspection team (8-15 August 1991):

The team visited seven declared sites. Among the declared sites visited by the team were the production sites at Al-Taji, the long-range gun site and production sites of the missile Badr 2000. The team also made sudden visits to six sites not covered by resolution 687 (1991) and found no activities incompatible with the said resolution. The Iraqi counterpart provided the team with additional documents and information related to the long-range gun and answered queries by the team.

(d) Fourth missile inspection team (6-13 September 1991):

The team visited five military sites in different areas and ordered the destruction of missile transport vehicles, which had been cut off under the supervision of a previous team to be then rewelded to be used for civilian purposes. The team also asked for the destruction of some empty and abandoned fuel tanks. The destruction was carried out under the team's supervision.

(e) Fifth missile inspection team (1-14 October 1991):

The team visited the sites of the stationary launching pads in the western region and supervised the destruction of all the stationary launching pads in the western region and the destruction of the long-range gun and its

major parts. During this visit the team made 16 visits to undeclared sites and found no activity incompatible with resolution 687 (1991) except for some concrete structures which were destroyed under the team's supervision.

(f) Sixth missile inspection team (1-9 December 1991):

The team inspected the western region to verify the destruction of the stationary pads. The team also visited Al-Kindy establishment in Mosul, Salahuddin establishment in Al-Dour, Nasr establishment and Al-Mutawakil project near Baghdad, and found nothing contrary to Iraq's declarations. The team asked that some equipment not be moved.

(g) Seventh missile inspection team (9-17 December 1991):

The team visited the ammunition depots in Haditha and the western region, and also made on 10 December a sudden visit to sites that are not related to the resolution, i.e. The Directorate of Baghdad Police, Al-Zawra Sports Club and Al-Karkh Education Directorate. The team found nothing contrary to Iraq's declaration.

3. Undertaking not to develop ballistic missiles

Paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled this through abandoning any activity related to the use or the development of ballistic missiles referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991). The seven ballistic missile inspection teams have practically verified such compliance when they found during their tours nothing that runs contrary to such compliance, particularly when their inspection tour covered the military camps, production sites, industrial facilities, airbases, military depots and civil sites, in addition to the aerial surveying carried out by some of those teams of several widespread areas, such as the western region, using helicopters.

B. Measures taken between January 1992 and November 1992

1. Submitting data about ballistic missiles

Paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq should submit data about its ballistic missiles of ranges greater than 150 kilometres, and about the major parts and equipment connected with them and the facilities for their repair and production.

In addition to what Iraq had submitted in accordance with this paragraph, new data were presented in response to questions raised by the Special

Commission. These data were given to the Special Commission delegation which visited Baghdad on 27 January 1992. Mr. Butler, who headed that delegation, praised the talks conducted with the Iraqi side and stressed the fact that the mission of his delegation had been a success and that a lot of gaps had been filled. On 19 March 1992, the Iraqi side announced, in a letter sent by the Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, that it had destroyed some equipment and weapons during the summer of 1991 in implementation of resolution 687 (1991). Below is a list of the weapons and equipment destroyed:

Ballistic missiles: equipment destroyed by the Iraqi side in the summer of 1991

	Items	Amount	Notes
1.	Al-Hussein missiles/Scud	89	
2.	Training missile/Scud	3	
3.	Missiles warheads	90	
4.	Russian-made mobile launcher	4	
5.	Iraqi-made mobile launcher	4	
6.	Testing and launching vehicles/Scud missiles	4	
7.	Support vehicles for Scud missile system	25	
8.	Transport vehicles for Scud missiles	16	
9.	Iraqi-made decoy launchers	5	
10.	Molds and fixtures for the Badr 2000 system	40	
11.	Transport vehicles for Badr 2000 motor	8	
12.	Imported and locally manufactured components and molds for Scud missile body	different quantities	
13.	Imported and locally manufactured components and molds for Scud missile motors	different quantities	

Items	Amount	Notes
14. Imported and locally manufactured components and molds for Scud missile control and guidance systems	different quantities	
15. Imported and locally manufactured components for Iraqi launchers	different quantities	

2. Destruction of ballistic missiles

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq destroy, remove or render harmless its ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometres, together with the major parts connected with them and the facilities of their production and repair. Iraq implemented this measure, and the inspection teams concerned verified the Iraqi statements and supervised the destruction of the missiles along with the mobile launchers and major parts connected with them, their fixed platforms, support equipment such as transport vehicles, missile supply vehicles, warheads, missile containers, tools and production molds. Below is a summary of the visits made by the inspection teams on ballistic missiles during the period 1 January to 1 September 1992:

(a) Eighth ballistic missiles inspection team:

The team, which was headed by Mr. Holland, visited Iraq during 21 to 29 February 1992. While in the country, the team inspected 10 sites declared by Iraq and made surprise visits to 7 other locations in no way connected with resolution 687 (1991). Having received a letter from New York, the inspection team halted its inspection activities and began to demand the destruction of equipment belonging to the Bilat Al-Shuhada factory.

(b) Ninth ballistic missiles inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Boothby, visited Iraq during 21 to 29 March 1992. During that visit, a number of sites declared by Iraq were inspected to verify Iraqi declarations that the Iraqi side had destroyed some equipment and weapons during the summer of 1991. The ninth inspection team also made surprise helicopter visits to locations unrelated to resolution 687 (1991), including military sites and private farms. This team also supervised the destruction of some equipment belonging to the Bilat Al-Shahada' plant. The head of the team was handed a list outlining the coordinates of the sites at which equipment and weapons were destroyed by the Iraqi side during the summer of 1991. These were items related to ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, and were destroyed in compliance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

(c) Tenth ballistic missile inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Holland, visited Iraq during 12 to 21 April 1992. The team visited a number of declared sites to verify Iraqi declarations and inspect the remains of the items destroyed by the Iraqi side during the summer of 1991. The team also supervised the destruction of the remaining equipment and buildings at the Billat Al-Shuhada' and made, together with the eighth chemical team, a joint surprise visit to the Institute of Security Development in Baghdad.

(d) Eleventh ballistic missile inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Tom Brok, visited Iraq during 14 to 22 May 1992, and inspected 11 declared sites to verify the correctness of Iraqi declarations about what had been destroyed by the Iraqi side during the summer of 1991. Iraqi declarations were verified. The team also made surprise visits to 10 other locations unrelated to resolution 687 (1991) and found nothing in contravention with the resolution. The Iraqi side answered the questions and queries by the inspection team and handed to the head of the team samples of destroyed parts of guidance and control systems. The head of the team was also given 33 pages of documents about the Sa'd 16 project along with lists of imported and manufactured molds which were observed at project 144.

(e) Twelfth ballistic missile inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Nikita Smidovitch, visited Iraq during 7 to 17 August 1992, made surprise visits to 10 locations and found nothing related to resolution 687 (1991). The head of the delegation was given parts of destroyed equipment which had been imported as part of the guidance and control system destroyed by the Iraqi side during the summer of 1991.

(f) Thirteenth ballistic missile inspection team:

The team, headed by Mr. Nikita Smidovitch, visited Iraq during 16 to 30 October 1992. During this visit, the team made surprise visits to 52 major and secondary locations and found nothing in contravention with resolution 687 (1991). The team also spent a total of 150 hours in discussion with the Iraqi side and returned with nearly 77 samples taken from the sites inspected by the team.

In some of its inspection operations, the team used helicopters in which it made 15 flights to reach 16 sites marked for inspection. The head of the team was also handed a special map and a list of future PC2 products.

The extended discussions held between the inspection team and the Iraqi side led to the closure of many fields and the removal of many suspicions created in the Special Commission by incorrect information it had received from countries hostile to Iraq. Most important amongst those files were:

(a) The numbers of missiles and their average annual launching during the Iraq-Iran war;

(b) The numbers of imported and locally manufactured launchers;

(c) Quantities of fuel and oxidizer and their production capabilities.

The Iraqi side has proven, in the light of the conclusions reached, the credibility of its previous declarations regarding the above-mentioned files. Thus, Iraq has proven once again that it is no longer in possession of any ballistic missile with a range over 150 kilometres or of any of the launchers used to fire such missiles.